order to assess whether and to what extent such assumptions might be justified. All societies are suis generis. Nonetheless, the application of generalized concepts and approaches can help characterize a society by identifying the similarities and differences against such implicit yardsticks. The end result might conceivably be a justification of this universalism, but it is perhaps more likely to identify differences that will require the amendation of concepts and theories if their general explanatory power is to be maintained.
The constant need to adjust concepts and approaches as the focus of comparison widens is particularly important at present when considering the interactions of political, economic, social, and cultural change in contemporary China. Post-Mao China has coincided with dramatic political changes internationally, especially during the last decade, that have all but universalized the project of modernization around a single model. It has become increasingly difficult to inquire, as was once extremely fashionable, about the convergent or divergent trends in the various patterns of relationships between state and society.
2 Convergence is now more or less assumed as a corollary of internationalization, with debate focusing on different paths and stages of development.
3 All the same the homogenizing impact of globalization may yet prove to be an overstatement, with convergence appearing either somewhat premature, or a function of the level at which generalization is attempted.
These prefatory comments are in many ways the necessary background to the question raised by some of the articles in this issue and by discussions at the workshop where they were first presented, as to the relevance of theory developed in a European context of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century social and political revolutions to China's still-Communist Party state and largely agrarian version of postsocialism. However, they also highlight some other key questions that attend the discussion of the development of contemporary popular culture, as well as some of the assumptions made in some of the descriptions of those developments. In particular, they draw attention to the changing relationships between politics and culture, and the identification of new agents of cultural change, as well as to the nature of the Chinese state's authoritarianism and the timing of its developmental process.
The post-Mao era, and even more the period since Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched themselves on their reformist path at the end of 1978, has seen significant changes in the relationship between politics and culture. Necessarily, this relationship has changed in response to the CCP's adjustments to its ideology. However, at the same time writers, artists, and the producers of culture were not slow to exploit the opportunities these changes permitted, and indeed by effectively lobbying ensured increasingly greater scope for their activities.
4 Perhaps the most important change was that which altered the system of political censorship from an active vetting before publication to a more passive regulation after the event.
5 Particularly during the 1990s, after Deng Xiaoping's Excursion to the South in 1992 and its provision of further direction to the reform agenda, culture became less didactic and more concerned with entertainment, more commercialized and more commercializable.
At the same time, there are also continuities in the relationship between politics and culture that cross the watersheds of both 1978 and 1992. Perhaps the most important is that the CCP has always been, and remains, concerned with popular culture. Li Hsiao-t'i's account of the emergence of a concern with "proletarian" literature during the 1930s highlights the process that led the CCP to see the advantages in both using and controlling the content of popular culture. 6 The yangge described by Jing Wang in her article and practiced by the elderly in Beijing during the 1990s is itself already a dance form proletarianized and homogenized by the CCP for its own purposes from a series of different popular origins in North China during the 1940s. As Li Hsiao-t'i suggests, this concern preceded Mao Zedong's address to the Yan'an Forum in May 1942. Moreover, as Jing Wang explicates, while the CCP's perspectives may have been adjusted during the last twenty years, the party's concern with the management and articulation of popular culture has not changed. Nor, for that matter, has the party closed down its internal propaganda hierarchy.
Consideration of the mechanics of the relationship between politics and culture also suggests that there are continuities as well as change. While the party-state has certainly moved from greater direct involvement in cultural affairs to greater regulation during the reform era, it would be easy to overstate its monopoly of cultural production before 1978 and to understate its involvement during the 1990s. Even at the height of the Mao-dominated era of China's politics, creators of culture did not have to be previously state-sanctioned in order to have access to public outlets such as museums, journals, or publishing houses. Unlike in the former USSR, writers, for example, were not required to be members of the official writers' association if they wanted to be published. The initiative for writing and translation was by no means monopolized by the party-state, and, for example, George Orwell's 1984 was already available in Chinese before the reform era started, having been translated by an English-speaking freelance translator. 8 In the reform era the party-state, for its part, has by no means surrendered completely its role as a creator of culture of all kinds. In part this is a qualitative argument. The electronic media-television in particular-became considerably more accessible and dominant during the 1980s, and yet they remain almost exclusively the province of the party-state. 9 In the print media, the number of journals has certainly increased since the mid-1970s when every province had a literary magazine and an "art and culture" journal that mirrored the national standard-bearers. The largest growth occurred in the following ten years, and by the mid-1980s there would have been about seven thousand such magazines.
10 Certainly, too, there are now magazines and journals published outside the resources of the party-state. However, the party-state remains a significant publisher and producer of culture. The main outlets for writers, for example, remain the party-state's now much larger stable of literary magazines and its publishing houses.
The party-state's influence is also far from absent, in a number of ways, in the formation of those new agents of cultural transmission to emerge in the 1990s. The explosion of popular culture has covered a diverse range of activities, from popular religions and the popularization of religion, through the creation of new forums for popular interactions, such as private restaurants, to pop music and magazines. The commercial environment is a major stimulus, and in most cases new companies have been established to develop these activities.
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Few of the new agents of cultural change have had no connection with the party-state. Many have worked in the party-state and taken their connections, and sometimes their training and expertise, in an appropriate activity into the nonstate sector. Particularly during the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, and especially in south and east China, as the economy began to grow, many local officials found themselves losing ground economically to their peers. One strategy for some was to experiment in the market sector of the economy, and many (though by no means all) private restaurateurs came into their new roles in that way. Sometimes, too, economic pressures convinced officials in the party-state that with their managerial and other skills they could do better in the market. In Shanxi, the daily newspaper Life of the City is produced by a former division-level cadre in the General Office of the Taiyuan CCP Committee, and Good Friends comes from a publishing company started by journalists and officials from the Shanxi Daily.
Many, too, are the relations, often the children, of officials of the party-state who build on their and their relatives' influence to develop their enterprises. A Buddhist advisory service was developed by the son of the mayor of a district-level city, who moreover was able to establish his enterprise in a building owned by the provincial committee of the CCP. A pop music producer's father had been party secretary of a rural district. So strong and transferable are these family connections that the children themselves can forswear membership in the CCP or positions in the party-state. Having a father who had been a long-term village leader, or senior cadre, in a provincial department makes party membership unnecessary and, indeed, for cultural activists runs the possibility of being counterproductive. However, the relationship between new cultural activities and the partystate is not just associational in those fairly obvious ways. (After all, where else would one expect well-educated, administratively competent new agents of cultural change to come from?) New cultural activities tend to have even closer structural relationships with the party-state. The party-state has not disappeared from economic interaction with society; it has simply adjusted the level at which those interactions take place. Local government now plays a central role in China's socioeconomic development. For cultural activities, as for economic enterprises, local government provides access to capital (funds, equipment, and buildings), labor, and political protection. Partly for a share of equity (and in order to generate income) and partly because it feels happier with corporatism at the local level (where it can claim a monitoring influence, particularly in the face of questions or difficulties from superior officials), local government in its turn is pressured to cooperate. The booming collective sector of the economy is largely at the level of local government and ensures financing and a network of influence to support activities that want to grow beyond the small scale of private enterprise.
These observations about the continued influence of the party-state would seem to confirm the arguments that suggest that the popular "from below" aspects of the drive for popular culture have been subverted "from above" in the 1990s. Certainly, as Jing Wang argues in her article, the party-state has developed a new ruling technology that seems designed not to let popular culture just be. However, as always in studying the contemporary PRC as it evolves, there is a need to stand back a bit. The party-state's aims may be clear, but they, too, can be thwarted by the very social processes it seeks to manage. Social and even political groups may be complicit in their own management through an evolving corporatism, but the net result is likely to be a synthesis of their interactions with the party-state. There may be few challenges to the existence of the party-state, but there are no guarantees that its agenda will be implemented at any given time, or at least not necessarily in the way that was originally intended.
The party-state's deliberate creation of provincial and regional cultures at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, and their subsequent development, has been instructive in this regard. 12 To encourage economic reform and local initiative, many provincial leaders purposefully encouraged the development of provincial and local cultures. Local histories and collections of local culture were published; local traditions were rediscovered and often commercialized themselves; and considerable emphasis in public rhetoric was placed on local identity and sense of place, particularly that of the province. Given the administrative origins of provinces, there was always likely to be an element of risk in this strategy. Few provinces had that kind of cultural identity beforehand. On the contrary, most provinces were administrative units intended as agents of central control. Their boundaries more usually cut across social and cultural patterns of interaction.
13
Across the provinces, the results of this strategy were very mixed. In a few provinces, the strategy would have to be regarded as successful. In Shanxi, talking about a provincial culture united a number of disparate local cultures and provided a confidence previously lacking, so that its annual economic growth has regularly outpaced the national rate.
14 In part the success of the cultural strategy can be attributed to the work of the republican era warlord Yan Xishan, who had provided a provincial consciousness absent in many other provinces. 15 In part, success can also be attributed to a strategy explicitly based on recognizing the province's more local cultures and emphasizing their commonalities.
However, in more provinces the emphasis on provincial identity and local culture was less successful in achieving the aims of the party-state. In some it backfired on those provincial leaderships who had introduced such strategies, and in others it exacerbated social and political problems. In Hubei, for example, an already unpopular provincial leader managed to alienate significant social and political interests and was forced to resign. 16 In Jiangxi the attempt to develop a provincial identity was always fighting a hard battle against the distinct local cultures, each of which looks more fondly to one of its four neighboring provinces than toward the collective entity. The result by the mid-1990s was an increase in the strength of these local identifications, with provincial affairs dominated by their interactions. 17 In Hainan, new emphases on the province merely sought to highlight tensions among the various communities-divided by language, economic activity, and often ethnicity as well as a generation of migration-each of which claimed to be the authentic provincial voice. 
